

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTABAN PELACOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MUNIZ, et. al.,
Defendants.

Case No. [16-cv-6666-TEH](#)

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint.

I

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id. § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by pro se litigants, however, must be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1 1990).

2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
3 allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the
4 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2)
5 that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under
6 the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

7 II

8 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately
9 indifferent to his health and safety and he received inadequate
10 medical care.

11 The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but
12 neither does it permit inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
13 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner receives in
14 prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject
15 to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney,
16 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual
17 punishment," the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison
18 officials, who may not, for example, use excessive force against
19 prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The
20 Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must
21 provide all prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as
22 food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal
23 safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; DeShaney v. Winnebago
24 County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989);
25 Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982).

26 A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two
27 requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be,
28 objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

1 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
2 (1991)), and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently
3 culpable state of mind, id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

4 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates
5 the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
6 punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin
7 v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other
8 grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136
9 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate
10 indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the
11 seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the
12 defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

13 A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a
14 prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury
15 or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. The
16 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would
17 find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence
18 of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's
19 daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial
20 pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a "serious"
21 need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60.

22 A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she
23 knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm
24 and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to
25 abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The
26 prison official must not only "be aware of facts from which the
27 inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
28 exists," but he "must also draw the inference." Id. If a prison

1 official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then
2 the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how
3 severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188
4 (9th Cir. 2002). "A difference of opinion between a prisoner-
5 patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does
6 not give rise to a § 1983 claim." Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d
7 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

8 In the prior complaints the Court found that Plaintiff had
9 presented sufficient allegations that correctional officers
10 Griewank and Lower-Brodersen were deliberately indifferent to his
11 health and safety by not providing him with a cane and then
12 having him walk down a steep ramp where he fell and was injured.

13 Defendants Washington¹ and Muniz who were named as
14 supervisors are dismissed from this action. "In a § 1983 or a
15 Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of
16 their servants - the term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer.
17 Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her
18 title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
19 misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)
20 (finding under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
21 (2007), and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that
22 complainant-detainee in a Bivens action failed to plead
23 sufficient facts "plausibly showing" that top federal officials
24 "purposely adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11

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26 ¹ Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant Washington made rude
27 comments fails to state a claim. Allegations of verbal
28 harassment and abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th
Cir. 1997) overruled in part on other grounds by Shakur v.
Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008).

1 detainees as 'of high interest' because of their race, religion,
2 or national origin" over more likely and non-discriminatory
3 explanations).

4 A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing
5 of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or
6 (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's
7 wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v.
8 Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Starr v.
9 Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). A plaintiff must
10 also show that the supervisor had the requisite state of mind to
11 establish liability, which turns on the requirement of the
12 particular claim – and, more specifically, on the state of mind
13 required by the particular claim – not on a generally applicable
14 concept of supervisory liability. Oregon State University
15 Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012).
16 Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient allegations against
17 the supervisor defendants.

18 Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Fu provided inadequate
19 medical care in treating Plaintiff's injuries. This claim is
20 also sufficient to proceed.

21 III

22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as
23 follows:

24 1. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the
25 United States Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a
26 copy of the second amended complaint (Docket No. 18), and a copy
27 of this order upon the following Defendants at Salinas Valley
28 State Prison: Correctional Officer J. Lower-Brodersen,

1 Correctional Officer B. Griewank and Dr. S. Fu. The remaining
2 Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

3 2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the
4 Court orders as follows:

5 a. No later than 91 days from the date of service,
6 Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment or other
7 dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate
8 factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to
9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and shall include as exhibits
10 all records and incident reports stemming from the events at
11 issue. If Defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be
12 resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior
13 to the date his summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed
14 with the Court shall be promptly served on the plaintiff.

15 b. At the time the dispositive motion is served,
16 Defendants shall also serve, on a separate paper, the appropriate
17 notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-
18 954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d
19 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003). See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d
20 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rand and Wyatt notices must be
21 given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to
22 dismiss for nonexhaustion is filed, not earlier); Rand at 960
23 (separate paper requirement).

24 c. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion,
25 if any, shall be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants
26 no later than thirty days from the date the motion was served
27 upon him. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed "NOTICE -
28 - WARNING," which is provided to him pursuant to Rand v. Rowland,

1 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Klinge v.
2 Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

3 If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment claiming
4 that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative
5 remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), plaintiff should
6 take note of the attached page headed "NOTICE -- WARNING
7 (EXHAUSTION)," which is provided to him as required by Wyatt v.
8 Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003).

9 d. If Defendant wishes to file a reply brief, he shall
10 do so no later than fifteen days after the opposition is served
11 upon him.

12 e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date
13 the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion
14 unless the court so orders at a later date.

15 3. All communications by Plaintiff with the court must be
16 served on defendant, or defendant's counsel once counsel has been
17 designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants
18 or defendants' counsel.

19 4. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal
20 Rules of Civil Procedure. No further court order under Federal
21 Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) is required before the parties
22 may conduct discovery.

23 5. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case.
24 Plaintiff must keep the court informed of any change of address
25 by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed "Notice of
26 Change of Address." He also must comply with the court's orders
27 in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the
28 dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/11/2017



THELTON E. HENDERSON
United States District Judge

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NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case.

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant's declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION)

If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. If the motion is granted it will end your case.

You have the right to present any evidence you may have which tends to show that you did exhaust your administrative remedies. Such evidence may be in the form of declarations (statements signed under penalty of perjury) or authenticated documents, that is, documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are authentic, or other sworn papers, such as answers to interrogatories or depositions. If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust and it is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.